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Abstract—The consumer Internet of Things (IoT) space has
experienced a significant rise in popularity in the recent years.
From smart speakers, to baby monitors, and smart kettles
and TVs, these devices are increasingly found in households
around the world while users may be unaware of the risks
associated with owning these devices. Previous work showed
that these devices can threaten individuals’ privacy and security
by exposing information online to a large number of service
providers and third party analytics services. Our analysis shows
that many of these Internet connections (and the information they
expose) are neither critical, nor even essential to the operation
of these devices. However, automatically separating out critical
from non-critical network traffic for an IoT device is nontrivial,
and requires expert analysis based on manual experimentation
in a controlled setting.
In this paper, we investigate whether it is possible to auto-
matically classify network traffic destinations as either critical
(essential for devices to function properly) or not, hence allowing
the home gateway to act as a selective firewall to block undesired,
non-critical destinations. Our initial results demonstrate that
some IoT devices contact destinations that are not critical to
their operation, and there is no impact on device functionality
if these destinations are blocked. We take the first steps towards
designing and evaluating IoTrimmer, a framework for automated
testing and analysis of various destinations contacted by devices,
and selectively blocking the ones that do not impact device
functionality.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consumer Internet of Things (IoT) devices are increasingly
seen in our households, including smart TVs and speakers,
surveillance cameras and doorbells, connected kitchen ap-
pliances, infrastructure monitoring devices, and wearables.
While these devices often come with interesting and beneficial
services, they open the door to a variety of privacy and security
risks. Privacy risks, at the network and application layers, have
been extensively covered in previous research [1]–[3]. IoT
devices often contact a large number of destinations [1] that
can be classified as: First party, manufacturer of the IoT device
responsible for providing and supporting the device func-
tionality; Support party, any companies providing outsourced
computing resources, such as CDN and cloud providers; and
Third party, any party that is not a first or support party,
including advertising and analytics companies.
While a number of experimental and commercial IoT
Security solutions are available for blocking malicious or
otherwise undesirable connections (see Section V for more),
these often rely on user configuration for each device, and
often provide an all-or-nothing connectivity option for traffic
destinations without considering whether blocking traffic will
break device functionality. There is a need for an approach that
can block network traffic with little-to-no user configuration,
and without breaking a device’s primary functionality. Doing
so can substantially reduce the privacy and security attack
surfaces for IoT devices. A key requirement for this approach
is to establish and maintain a list of network destinations that
are essential for device functionality, and thus should not, in
general, be blocked.
In this paper, we make a first attempt at providing an
automated framework for detecting and isolating such non-
critical communications from IoT devices. We design and
implement IoTrimmer, a tool for rigorously testing the network
connections made by each device against their functionality,
and establishing whether limiting those specific connections
adversely affects the device functionality. In a way, IoTrimmer
works like a firewall or an ad blocker [4] for IoT devices
that can be implemented on a home gateway. By using the
device companion apps (on smartphones), IoTrimmer is able
to automatically control IoT devices and trigger their actions.
Our key research contributions include:
• Designing and implementing automated experiments and
self-validation for the interaction between IoT devices
and their respective smartphone companion apps.
• Understanding DNS behavior for each device, i.e., col-
lecting the set of destinations based on DNS requests.
• Automatically detecting if such destinations are critical,
i.e., required for proper device functionality, and itera-
tively filtering the non-critical ones.
As a proof-of-concept study for IoTrimmer, we use three
IoT devices: two security cameras and a smart bulb. By
running more than 1,000 automated experiments, we find that
some devices make more network connections than needed
for them to function normally. There are some commonalities
among the non-critical destinations contacted by different IoT
devices: some IoT devices contact non-critical destinations
outside their region, and out of 9 destinations contacted by
our three IoT devices, 4 are unnecessary.
While this short paper covers only a small number of
devices at the time of writing, we are expanding our analysis
to a much larger set. Based on our initial findings, we argue
that our methodology has potential for: (i) Ability to evaluate
portability of the filter list from one device to other devices;
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(ii) Understanding partially-necessary destinations (i.e. those
necessary for one functionality but not for others); and (iii)
evaluating blocking strategies and their impact on functional-
ity.
II. GOALS AND ASSUMPTIONS
In this work we attempt to measure non-critical communica-
tion from popular consumer IoT devices to servers in the wild.
In particular, we focus on characteristics of the destinations of
their IP traffic, whether such communication is needed for the
standard functionality of the device. In this section, we define
our key questions, challenges, and implications concerning
destinations contacted by IoT devices.
Goals
The goal of this work is to answer the following research
questions.
Do IoT devices communicate with destinations that are
not critical to their functionality? When a device initiates
a communication with a destination over the Internet, it is
by definition exposing some information. Since from our
experience the vast majority of IoT traffic is encrypted, we
do not know what information is actually exposed. However,
we can assume that if the device still works after blocking a
destination, that destination is unlikely to be essential to the
functionality of the device (and thus the potential information
exposure is not needed). To answer this question, we track all
the destinations that are not essential for the standard function-
ality of the device (i.e., considering a smart bulb, destinations
that are not necessary for switching the light on/off). From now
on we refer to these destinations as blockable destinations.
Are there any patterns or trends on the blockable desti-
nations among different devices? While there are a number
of ways to classify destinations, in this short paper we focus
only on whether any non-critical destinations are universal—
i.e., non-critical for different devices and categories.
Assumptions
We consider as destination the DNS destination, the domain
name requested by the device, according to its DNS queries.
We further distinguish destinations as follows:
• Same domain, different ports is considered a different
destination.
• Two different IPs, resulting from resolving the same
DNS destination, and contacted on the same port, are
considered the same destination.
• We use IP addresses in place of DNS name if there is no
DNS name (i.e. hard-coded IP addresses).
III. IoTrimmer ARCHITECTURE
We briefly introduce the mechanisms used by the IoTrimmer
to validate the automated experiments. Then, we describe our
approach for understanding DNS behavior for consumer IoT
devices and demonstrate the IoTrimmer operations.
Testbed Setup and Devices
To test our IoTrimmer, we have built a testbed that currently
comprises 122 different IoT devices in two labs, one in the
US and one in the UK. We selected these devices to provide
diversity within and between different categories: surveillance,
video, audio, hub, appliance and home automation devices. In
addition to the devices, a Linux server running Ubuntu 18.04
with two Wi-Fi cards for 2.4 GHz and 5 GHz connections,
plus two 1 Gbps Ethernet connections for LAN and Internet
connectivity are part of the setup. The server sits outside of any
firewall and has a public IPv4 address. However, to match a
regular home network environment, all IoT devices are behind
a NAT setup and cannot be accessed directly from the Internet.
The monitoring software automatically detects connection
of a new device to the network, assigns it a local IP address,
and starts capturing packets using tcpdump. Each device’s
traffic is filtered by MAC address into separate files. The IoT
devices can usually be controlled via a companion device such
as a smartphone application, an Alexa voice assistant or a
Google Home. Our testbed allows us to perform automated ex-
periments on the IoT devices using these companion devices.
In this case, the monitoring software captures the network
traffic of both IoT and companion devices into separate PCAP
files. The testbed allows us to capture several network traces
for each device, get destinations and perform self-validating
automated experiments under different conditions. Finally, the
testbed allows us to block traffic at device level by overriding
DNS answers for specific hostnames using bind’s view and
RPZ zones.
Self-validating Automated Experiments
The IoT devices can usually be controlled by a smartphone
app or other IoT devices. An empowering factor of IoTrimmer
is automation. Our IoTrimmer involves automated interactions.
For IoT devices that require a companion app, we use Nexus
5X smartphones running Android 6.0.1. We rely on the Mon-
key Application for Android Studio [5] for automating the
interaction between the user and the IoT device. We conduct
power experiments and automated interaction experiments
to analyze the destinations contacted by each device under
various conditions.
Power experiments. In our previous study [1], we found that
many IoT devices transmit significant amount of traffic every
time they are powered off and on. Based on this, the power
experiments consist of controlling the devices through several
TP-Link smart plugs that supports local control using a console
application. Thanks to these smart plugs, we are able to control
the power status of the IoT devices under test, and power them
off and on through scripts. We force the devices to be off for
a certain amount of time, then we turn them on and capture
the network traffic for two more minutes with no operation.
We automatically repeat the operation multiple times for every
IoT device.
Interaction experiments. To detect the unnecessary destina-
tions for an IoT device, we conduct interaction experiments.
An IoT device can have different functionalities, for example
UNBLOCKABLE
a)	Power	off/on	the	device
2.	GET		THE	LIST	OF
DESTINATIONS
a)	when	powering	off	
b)	Start	functionality
and	get	the	screenshot
for	autovalidation
List
b)	when	switching
on/off	the	light	
1.	START	FUNCTIONALITY 3.	BLOCK	THE
DESTINATION
127.0.0.1
a)	DNS	override
b)	test
functionality
4.	AUTO	VALIDATION
SUCCESSFUL FAILED
BLOCKABLE
c)	get	the
screenshot
Fig. 1: Overview of IoTrimmer for the TP-Link smart bulb: (a) step 1, power off/on the device and start functionality; step
2, get the list of destinations; step 3, block the destination using DNS override; step 4, test the functionality and perform the
auto validation.
switching on/off the light for a smart bulb is the main function-
ality, but the app can also provide an option for controlling the
brightness. To avoid mixing traffic from previous experiments,
we perform interaction experiments every two minutes. After
two minutes, and just before the communication begins, we
start capturing the traffic and analyze the destinations con-
tacted during the interactions required to trigger the device
functionality.
Our interaction experiments include: (i) LAN application
functionality, when the phone used for the interaction is
on the same network as the IoT device, in which case the
IoT device may communicate directly with the phone; (ii)
WAN application functionality, when the phone is on another
network than the IoT device. In this case the device must use
a cloud service for communicating with the phone.
The interaction between the IoT device and the phone
app may fail. As part of the interaction experiments, we
created a tool for validating them using screenshots matching.
Screenshots may change because of dynamic data (i.e., time
and temperature, appearance of pop up in the app, etc.), hence
we only consider the part of the screen where the functionality
is visible and crop that area. Figure 1 Step 4 shows the
methodology for such operation.
We perform the auto-validation in 6 steps:
1) Automatically capturing all the screenshots of a given
functionality of the companion app and use those screen-
shot as baseline for comparison.
2) Starting the functionality automatically by opening the
app using Monkey and sending the proper sequence of
presses to trigger such functionality (i.e., switching on
the light).
3) Using adb shell for taking the screenshot after the device
interactions have been completed.
4) Transferring the screenshot from the phone to the pro-
cessing server.
5) On the processing server, comparing the current screen-
shot with the base screenshot, using ImageMagick.1
6) If the screenshots match, we flag the experiment as
successful, otherwise we consider it failed.
1https://imagemagick.org/
DNS Behavior
We created some experiments for understanding the DNS
behavior for the IoT device. We perform various power
experiments, switching off the devices for 2sec, 4min, 8min,
16min, 32min, 64min, 128min, 188min. This test helps us to
understand the minimum duration to switch off a device before
getting the list of destinations, in order to get as many DNS
queries as possible.
Detecting and Blocking Destinations
IoTrimmer is able to automatically detect the list of desti-
nations contacted by the IoT device and block the ones that
are not necessary for the standard functionality of the device.
Depending on the outcome of the self-validation, a destination
can be either:
• blockable for all experiments for that device: blocking
the destination does not break any functionality of the
device.
• blockable for some experiments: blocking the destina-
tion breaks some of the functionalities of the device.
• unblockable: blocking the destination breaks all the
functionalities of the device.
IoTrimmer consists of two main steps, we (i) first gather the
list the destinations contacted by the device when powering
off and on and while performing the functionality and (ii)
secondly we block the destinations one by one by testing the
functionality using the auto validation tool.
The steps are described below:
1) Powering off the device for two minutes. We capture the
traffic for two minutes and get destinations.
2) Powering off the device again for two minutes. We start
the functionality (i.e. switching on the light) and capture
the traffic until the functionality execution is complete.
3) Performing the auto validation as shown in Figure 1 and
get the list of destinations contacted during power and
interaction experiments.
4) Blocking the destination one by one by first powering
off the device for two minutes. We block the destination
using DNS override to map the DNS name to localhost
(127.0.0.1), effectively sending all traffic for that site to
the loopback address.
5) Starting the functionality (i.e. switching on the light) and
wait the necessary time until the functionality execution
is complete.
6) Performing again the auto validation.
7) Based on the results of the auto validation, we flag the
destination as either blockable or unblockable for that
specific functionality.
Repeating Experiments
We repeat the experiments at least 30 times per device, per
functionality. In order to check the correct functionality of the
experiment, IoTrimmer sends a notification to us automatically,
if the auto validation fails for more than three times in a row.
IV. IOTRIMMER
In this section, we study the destinations contacted by the
IoT devices and then present the results from IoTrimmer. As
an example, we consider three IoT devices from our testbed:
TP-Link smart bulb, Yi Camera, and Bosiwo camera.
Domain Destination Analysis. Table I shows the list of
domains contacted by the devices during the interactions and
power experiments. For example, TP-Link smart bulb contacts
five domains during the power and the action of switching
on/off the light: two NTP servers for synchronize the time,
the TP-Link domains and the Amazon Web Server for the
functionality of switching on/off the light.
IPs Destination Analysis and Hard-Coded IPs. Some de-
vices may have hard-coded IPs. The IP address contacted is
assigned manually in the settings of the device and does not
change. The Bosiwo camera for example contacted a hard-
coded IP address. We use WHOIS data for identifying the
owner of the IP address as reported by the corresponding
regional registry.
DNS Behavior. We study the number of unique DNS queries
per device, per duration of the power experiment. Results show
that the bulb made 5 queries and the cameras made 2 queries
each, regardless of the duration of the power experiment. The
test validates that it is safe for each experiment to wait no
more than 2 minutes for getting the destinations.
Blockable Destinations. Table II shows the destinations con-
tacted by the device and whether it is blockable or not (3, 7).
Among 9 destinations contacted, 4 are blockable (i.e., blocking
them does not affect the device functionality for that given
experiment). At least one destination is blockable for each
device.
Blockable destinations are mostly support parties, needed
for clock synchronization (ntp.org, nist.org) and logs
(log.us.xiaoyi.com), except for the hard-coded IP contacted by
the Bosiwo camera. It is not immediately clear why the camera
continuously pings that IP address. Our analysis shows that the
owner of the IP is Computer Network Information Center in
China.
Table III summarizes the characteristics of the traffic sent to
the destinations that are blockable. The traffic includes NTP,
TCP over port 80 (HTTP traffic), and ICMP protocols.
Generalization Analysis. We now investigate similarities
among blockable destinations (e.g., same port, domain, or-
ganization, 2nd-level domain, etc.). This helps to generalize
the blocking from one to other devices. Results show that
support services such as AmazonAWS are never blockable,
while servers for NTP traffic are always blockable for all the
experiments and all the devices. Some destinations may be
blockable for one functionality and unblockable for others,
we do not detect that behavior.
Longitudinal Analysis. We also perform experiments for
understanding whether a destination is blockable at given time
and not blockable anymore after a certain amount of time. We
repeat the experiments in different times for a period of one
month. We did not find any significant differences on blockable
destinations or destinations contacted.
V. RELATED WORK
The increasing awareness in privacy and security risks in
the consumer IoT market has led to a number of tools to
protect against abnormal IoT traffic. For example, SPIN2 is an
open source software tool which focuses on visualizing and
blocking traffic to and from IoT devices. Tools and platforms
such as ShieldIOT,3 Fing,4 and Bitdefender5 provide solutions
to protect against known vulnerabilities, or to isolate devices
from the network based on their MAC/IP address. However,
the majority of these solutions depends on existing knowledge
of devices and their destinations, which is not easy to obtain
and evaluate with an ever-expanding set of devices.
There are a number of existing tools for IoT traffic and
privacy risk analysis. For examples, IoT Inspector [6] collects
smart home traffic in scale using ARP spoofing. In recent
work [1], we studied information exposure from 81 consumer
IoT devices from two testbeds in different countries.
One of our main objectives is to analyze and block destina-
tions specifically for a given device, and for specific device-
functionality scenarios. IoTrimmer tests the device function-
ality and blocks the destinations which are blockable without
impacting other functionalities. IoTrimmer will also help to
define general rules for blocking unnecessary destinations in
smart home environments, in manner similar to ad blockers in
browsers [7].
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Having motivated the need for identifying non-critical desti-
nations in IoT environments, we created and tested IoTrimmer,
an automated framework that filters those non-critical connec-
tions, testing automatically the device functionality.
We presented results from three IoT devices in our lab, two
cameras and a smart bulb. We performed more than 1,000
automated experiments and validated them. Most devices make
more network connections than needed for them to function
normally. Out of 9 destinations contacted by three of our
2https://spin4home.nl/
3https://shieldiot.io/
4https://www.fing.com/
5https://www.bitdefender.com/iot/
Device Activity # of # of Domains/hard-coded IPsdomains hard-coded IPs
TP-Link smart bulb LAN/WAN switch off/on, power 5 0 tplinkra.com, tplinkcloud.com, ntp.org, amazonaws.com, nist.gov
Yi Camera LAN/WAN watch, power 2 0 log.us.xiaoyi.com (WAN only), api.us.xiaoyi.com
Bosiwo Camera LAN/WAN watch, power 2 1 vimtag.com, amazonaws.com, 210.72.145.44
TABLE I: List of contacted destinations per device.
Device Activity Domains Blockable
TP-Link smart bulb LAN switch off/on tplinkra.com 7
TP-Link smart bulb LAN switch off/on tplinkcloud.com 7
TP-Link smart bulb LAN switch off/on ntp.org 3
TP-Link smart bulb LAN switch off/on amazonaws.com 7
TP-Link smart bulb LAN switch off/on nist.gov 3
TP-Link smart bulb WAN switch off/on tplinkra.com 7
TP-Link smart bulb WAN switch off/on tplinkcloud.com 7
TP-Link smart bulb WAN switch off/on ntp.org 3
TP-Link smart bulb WAN switch off/on amazonaws.com 7
TP-Link smart bulb WAN switch off/on nist.gov 3
Yi Camera LAN watch api.us.xiaoyi.com 7
Yi Camera WAN watch api.us.xiaoyi.com 7
Yi Camera WAN watch log.us.xiaoyi.com 3
Bosiwo Camera LAN watch vimtag.com 7
Bosiwo Camera LAN watch amazonaws.com 7
Bosiwo Camera LAN watch 210.72.145.44 3
Bosiwo Camera WAN watch vimtag.com 7
Bosiwo Camera WAN watch amazonaws.com 7
Bosiwo Camera WAN watch 210.72.145.44 3
TABLE II: List of blockable/unblockable destinations per
device.
Destination #of Devices Protocol Port Amount of Traffic(%)
ntp.org 1 NTP 123 1.53
nist.org 1 NTP 123 1.47%
log.us.xiaoyi.com 1 TCP 80 2.8%
210.72.145.44 1 ICMP 123 0.12%
TABLE III: Traffic characterization for the blockable desti-
nations. For each destination we list the number of devices
contacting that destination, the protocol, the destination port
and the average amount of traffic (in percentage) sent to that
destination over the total traffic sent for the entire duration of
the experiment.
tested IoT devices, 4 are blockable. Some devices, such as
the Bosiwo camera, contact destinations located in countries
outside of their testbed’s privacy jurisdiction.
In this paper we demonstrated that limiting NTP traffic
does not affect the device functionality over the timescale of
our study; however time desynchronization may affect other
functionalities (e.g., certificate validation) in some cases. As
future work, we plan to analyze the cascading effects of
limiting that kind of traffic, and alternatives to always blocking
(e.g., allowing clock synchronization at randomized intervals).
We also plan to detect whether each non-critical destination is
used for other important purposes (e.g., updating the firmware
of the device). In addition to exploring non-critical traffic for
more devices and over longer timescales, we will investigate
the potential for blocking traffic between devices in the same
LAN, and study differences arising from deploying the same
devices in different geographical regions. Finally, we plan to
implement and evaluate IoTrimmer on an edge platform such
as the Databox [8] as a home gateway device.
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